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Research grants: problems and options
B RIAN M ARTIN
University of Wollongong

Introduction

1. Bias

Researchers often complain about research grant schemes,
but usually within a narrow frame of reference. Looking
more broadly, problems with grant schemes can be classified as bias, waste, discouragement and orientation to
interests. There are various ways to allocate research
funds, including administrative decision, peer review,
performance-based allocation, equality and communitybased bids. Each has different sorts of problems and serves
different interests. By looking at diverse systems for allocating research funds, some of the assumptions underlying
usual discussions become more apparent. Recent changes
in Australian government policy on higher education
research are examined using the framework provided
here.
Any research grants scheme is likely to generate a great
deal of informal complaint. Not surprisingly, dissatisfaction is most common among unsuccessful applicants, with
complaints about bias and wasted effort. Administrators
worry about making the system work efficiently. Reformers seek methods of making better decisions, for example
by changing selection criteria and peer review systems,
and ensuring accountability.
However, most of the discussions about grant schemes
deal only with minor changes within the same basic
structure. Yet the structure of a scheme is often the primary
determinant of the sorts of problems that it generates. This
article aims to provide a broader perspective on this issue.
I start by outlining several key types of problems with
grant schemes and then lay out several types of methods
for decision making. With this foundation, it is straightforward to note the sorts of problems most commonly or
likely to be associated with decision-making systems.
Finally, recent changes in Australian government policy
on higher education research are assessed using the broad
framework offered here. (Some of the sources cited below
deal with peer review for journals, but their assessments
are likely to apply to peer review for grants as well.)

Among applicants, especially unsuccessful ones, allegations of bias are commonplace. They include the following.
• Success-breeds-success bias: successful applicants are
likely to become entrenched, using their grants to
produce the outputs necessary to attract further funds,
while others never have the chance to get started.

Problems
What constitutes a problem with a grant scheme, of
course, depends on the observer. Hence the focus needs
to be on perceived problems, acknowledging that widespread perception of a problem may be a problem in itself,
whatever the ‘facts’. Here, several different types of
problem are outlined.

• Insider bias: decisions are made by cliques of insiders,
who think highly of, and award most grants to,
themselves and a small group of favourites.
• Dominant group bias: there is discrimination against
groups such as women, ethnic minorities and lowerstatus institutions (Peters and Ceci, 1982; Wenneras
and Wold, 1997).
• Conventional approach bias: grants are much more
likely to support tried-and-true approaches, while
challenging, innovative or unorthodox proposals are
seldom funded (Armstrong, 1996, 1997; Epstein, 1990;
Horrobin 1990, 1996).
• Personal bias: administrators or referees obstruct researchers or projects that they do not like (Horrobin,
1974).
To these possibilities can be added ‘random bias’ due to
incompetence of administrators or referees.

2. Waste
Any grant scheme requires administrative overheads to
assess applications. In addition, applicants may spend a
large amount of time preparing applications. Even in an
efficiently run operation, the cost associated with running
the scheme and preparing applications can be a significant
proportion of the money awarded in grants, especially if
the grants are small and the success rate is low. In addition,
not all grant schemes are run efficiently, aggravating the
problem of waste.

3. Discouragement
Most of the attention in grant schemes is on those who are
successful, but there can be significant effects on those
who are unsuccessful. They can be disheartened by
rejections or become resentful. This provides fertile soil for
beliefs that decisions are biased, which help to alleviate
the stigma of failure. Any competitive system creates this
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problem, whether it is grading in schools or promotion
systems at work. There is considerable evidence that
competition reduces intrinsic motivation (Kohn, 1993).
Even for more successful applicants, the goal of winning
a grant may become more significant than doing the
research.

4. Orientation to interests
The possibility of getting a grant provides an incentive to
do research that pleases those dispensing the money.
Grants provided by a corporation or government department for research in particular fields—telecommunications or pesticides—obviously orient researchers to particular problems. This is not necessarily a problem in itself,
but can be seen to be one in the wider context of social
priorities. In short, research is oriented to those who have
money to dispense. Social problems which no one has a
vested interest in solving receive few resources (Arditti et
al., 1980; Dickson, 1984; Martin, 1979).
Many government grant schemes are oriented not to
problems but to acquisition of knowledge. Grants go to
applicants who best make the case that they are pushing
back the frontiers in astronomy or brain structure. Even in
these cases, it can be argued that there is an indirect
orientation to outside interests. For example, problems in
numerical analysis or oceanography may be influenced by
military priorities; problems in organic chemistry or electrical engineering may be influenced by corporate priorities. This influence can occur through paradigms, potential applications of pure research, or job prospects.
Finally, researchers have a vested interest in their own
careers, including positions and status. In as much as top
researchers are influential in making decisions about
grants, it is likely that the system of research—based on
full-time professional specialists—will be perpetuated.
This may be at the expense of other priorities, such as
pressing social problems. The familiar example of researchers recommending further research is symptomatic
of the problem that the grant system is oriented to the
interests of researchers at the expense of others.

Methods
Researchers are so familiar with peer review—not least
through refereed journals—that it may seem that there is
no sensible alternative. But actually there are various
possibilities. The following are five possibilities, chosen
because they have the potential to deal effectively with
one or more of the problems noted above. They are
presented as ideal types. In practice, actual allocation of
research funds typically combines elements of several of
these methods.

R E V I E W

Method A: administrative decision
In this ideal system, all decisions about research priorities
and funding are made by top administrators, who may or
may not be researchers themselves. In making their
decisions, the administrators take advice from a range of
groups: political and economic leaders, researchers, lobbyists and so forth. The approach is typical of research in
large bureaucracies, especially government (in particular
the military) and corporations. The justification for this
approach is service to national, public or shareholder
interest, which are often taken as synonymous. The
research system emphasises co-operation and teamwork,
the exemplar being the Manhattan project for producing
the first nuclear weapons.
The patterns of research in the world today reflect highlevel administrative decisions. This applies not just to most
government and corporate research but also to much
university research, since administrators make most of the
decisions to decide the distribution of funds between
different fields, provide research infrastructure, and to set
up specific research centres and programs. For example,
the framework for deciding the allocation of research
funding between telecommunications engineering and
musicology within a university is normally decided by
managers, rather than by peer comparisons, equal distribution or public opinion poll. There is, of course, no
objective method to decide such an allocation.
Researchers and other pressure groups do have some
influence on such administrative decisions. For example,
researchers and consumer groups have some influence on
the research agendas of electricity authorities and electronics firms. Although administrative decision is widely
used, it has received relatively little critical attention
compared to peer review; there are only a few researchers
who enthusiastically advocate it (McCutchen, 1977).

Method B: peer review
In this model, decisions about research priorities and
funding are made by peers, namely professional researchers knowledgeable in relevant areas, in a competitive
merit-based system. The justification for peer review is that
peers are best able to judge the merit of research and that
high-quality research is best able to advance knowledge
and serve the public interest.
Peer review can be implemented in various ways.
Applications can be sent to anonymous referees who rate
them. Alternatively, applications might all be judged by a
small panel without any outside comment. As long the
panel members are knowledgeable in the field, this is still
judgement by peers, though more open to accusations of
bias. Some key elements in peer review systems are:
• independence or otherwise of referees;
• anonymity of referees versus open peer review;
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• criteria for decision making;
• method of decision making.
There is a large literature on peer review, and much
discussion (Armstrong, 1997; Campanario, 1995; Chubin
and Hackett, 1990; Daniel, 1993; Peters and Ceci, 1982;
Wessely, 1998). However, for the purposes here, the
various options in peer review systems are secondary to
the main point that ranking of competing applications is
primarily based on judgements by peers.
After administrative decision, peer review plays a significant role in setting research priorities and making funding
decisions. This operates in grants schemes and in decisions at the research project level within universities and,
to a lesser extent, in some government and corporate
research units. As noted above, administrative decisions
play a central role in setting the framework for many peerreview decisions.

Method C: performance-based funding
This method funds researchers according to the outputs
that they have produced, such as publications and patents
(Forsdyke, 1993; Roy, 1984). By defining the desired sorts
of performance and defining the rewards, performancebased funding can be implemented without formal grant
applications at all. For example, each paper in a specified
journal (perhaps weighted by the journal’s impact factor)
could result in a defined payment to the authors. The
research quantum allocated to Australian universities
relies on a formula including weights for publications,
research degree completions and funds received. This is
similar to Roy’s (1984) proposal for allocation of funds to
groups of researchers based on group productivity. Obviously, peer judgements influence funding via the outputs,
but performance-based funding differs from typical peer
review systems in being based strictly on outputs rather
than grant applications. One justification for performancebased allocation is to avoid direct biases based on reputation, gender or research findings.
Offering prizes for discoveries can be considered to be
another type of performance-based funding. Nobel prize
winners receive not only money but fame which often can
be translated into further resources.

Method D: equality
In this approach, every researcher gets either an equal
amount of funding or an equal chance at funding. Some
minimum requirements can be put on who is eligible, such
as all staff at a university or in a research group. Among
those who are eligible, available funding can be divided
up in any of several ways:
• Each year, available funds are equally divided between researchers.

R E V I E W

• Researchers take turns receiving significant grants.
• Grants are awarded using a lottery.
A considerable proportion of research funds are
currently allocated using this method, at least nominally. If university staff are expected to devote one third of
their time to research, then one third of the budget for
salaries could be said to be allocated using the method
of rough equality (though since salaries are different,
the nominal allocation is not equal). For some humanities research, for example, time and access to good
libraries are the most crucial elements, and additional
research funding is less significant. On the other hand,
in many technical fields, salaries are only the beginning
of what is required to undertake research.

Method E: community-based allocation
In this model, research priorities and funding are
decided by a range of community groups, such as
groups of workers, parents or neighbours. The key
feature is that users at the grassroots would make the
decisions, rather than administrators or researchers.
Currently this approach is used for only a limited
amount of research, and therefore it is worthwhile
spelling out briefly how it might work.
One procedure is to have a panel selected randomly
from volunteers from user groups. The panel would
hear submissions from researchers and other interested
groups and then make decisions about research priorities and funding.
Another possible, and rather different, procedure is
for user groups to prepare submissions for research to
be carried out by particular researchers. The researchers, who would be expected to do a certain amount of
research selected from the user-group applications,
would choose which projects they preferred to undertake. This is analogous to the way university departments are expected to provide a certain amount of
teaching selected from areas that students want to
study. The justification for community-based allocation
is to serve human needs.
So-called “science shops”—perhaps better described
as knowledge shops—are the closest thing to community-based allocation. They take questions from community groups, trade unions, small businesses and
other organisations without significant resources for
research, help to turn the these questions into researchable topics, and seek to find university students or staff
to carry out relevant projects (Farkas, 1999; Zaal and
Leydesdorff, 1987).
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provide greater infrastructure or funding for certain faculties. This is because peer review mainly concerns
judgements within disciplines (peer
Table 1. Each method of allocation is matched
groups). The key research decisions,
against each major type of problem
by contrast, concern judgements beProblem Bias
Waste
Discouragement Orientation to
tween disciplines.
interests
Concentrating on problems with
Method
grants schemes as they currently exist
also diverts attention from the possiAdministrative
Potential bias in
Preparation of
Poorly supported
Incentive to serve
decision
favour of insiders,
proposals; decision researchers may
interests of
bility of greater participation by comdominant groups
system overheads
become
administrators
munity groups and individuals in setdemoralised
ting priorities for research. There are
Peer review
Potential bias in
Preparation of
Unsuccessful
Incentive to serve
many ways in which such participafavour of insiders,
applications; grant
applicants may
interests of
tion could be increased, such as by
dominant groups,
scheme overheads
become
granting body or
community representatives on institusuccessful
demoralised
peers
researchers
tional boards or advisory panels for
Performance-based
research groups, as well as being givLow output
Incentive to serve
Grant scheme
Potential bias in
funding
performers
interests associated
favour of successful overheads
en a say over potential research projects
(including those
with output
(especially
and/or superficial
(Bammer et al., 1986). But most such
measures
with high quality)
researchers
collection of
proposals are well and truly off the
may become
performance data)
demoralised
agenda. The main contenders for influence are interest groups (especially
Equal allocation
Bias against those
Money spent on
High performers
Incentive for
excluded from the
those who are
may resent
researchers to
government and large corporations)
equal allocation
unproductive
allocations to
serve their own
and researchers (especially elite rethose who are
interests
searchers).
unproductive
Essentially, the perennial complaints
Community-based
Potential bias in
Effort spent by
Researchers who
Incentive to serve
about
grants schemes reflect the deallocation
favour of insiders,
community groups
are not sought
community
pendent but privileged position of
preferred groups
in finding
after may feel
interests
researchers
unworthy
most researchers. They benefit from
the allocation of substantial social resources
to
their
salaries
and research projects. They are
Although no allocation system is free of bias, waste,
reluctant
to
question
the
dominant
institutions that control
discouragement or orientation to interest groups, the
their
funding,
or
the
framework
in
which
it occurs. Few of
expression of these problems can be quite different with
them
believe
that
groups
in
the
community—at
least those
different systems. For example, community-based allocawith
little
money—should
have
any
direct
say
in
research
tion provides incentives to do research serving quite
priorities.
That
would
be
threatening
to
their
prerogatives
different interests than administrative decision. The choice
and status, built up through peer systems.
of an allocation system both reflects and shapes an

Assessment

ongoing connection between researchers and interest
groups.
Most of the complaints commonly voiced about grant
schemes—such as bias in favour of insiders or against
innovators—concern more-or-less inevitable features of
competitive systems of allocation. The usual focus on the
problems with peer review and biases in grant schemes
draws attention away from both the realities of how
research priorities are set and the possibilities for greater
community participation in setting research agendas.
Broad research priorities are set primarily by administrative decision. Concentrating on problems with peer review systems diverts attention from this reality. Indeed,
peer review does not even provide the means for making
many of the central decisions affecting research, such as
decisions to set up institutions or departments or to
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The Australian research system
Recently, the Australian government has made major
policy changes affecting funding for higher education
research (DETYA, 1999). Although the changes are significant so far as Australian research policy goes, they are
relatively minor within the wider context outlined in this
article.
Administrative decision remains the dominant method
for setting research priorities and allocating funding for
much Australian research, including most corporate research, both in-house and sponsored, as well as much inhouse government research. Within the university sector,
administrative decision is commonly used to decide on
major infrastructure projects and the relative staffing and
funding of different departments. Often these decisions
are mediated through formulas, themselves agreed to
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through administrative processes. None of this is greatly
affected by the government’s policy changes.
Academic staff are expected to do research and typically
are allocated a nominal proportion of their working week
to do so. This proportion can vary enormously, from fulltime for research-only positions to virtually zero for staff
overloaded with teaching or administration. Despite the
large inequalities in available research time, nevertheless
it is more equally distributed than research grants. It is
certainly the element of research support that most closely
fits the principle of equal allocation. In addition, full-time
research students, who carry out a substantial proportion
of research done in universities, typically spend most of
their time engaged in research, even more closely following the principle of equal allocation. The government’s
policy changes do not explicitly address time available for
research, though there may be changes in time allocation
as an indirect effect.
Community-based allocation has never been a basis for
research funding in Australia. Australian science shop
initiatives have received little institutional support (Bammer et al., 1992). There would be a few cases where
community groups, without research funds to disperse,
approach academics or students in order to get relevant
projects carried out. The government’s research policy is
entirely geared towards research oriented to groups that
can pay, especially large corporations and government
itself. The white paper makes no mention of community
input into research priorities.
Peer review is the method used by the Australian
Research Council (ARC) and the National Health and
Medical Research Council (NHMRC) to decide allocation
of research grants. However, peer review operates only
within an overall framework—such as the relative allocations to engineering and humanities—that is decided
administratively. The white paper signals a change to peer
review procedures and their administration. Two ARC
innovations will be the appointment of program managers
to oversee the peer review system and the use of external
reviewers to rank grant applications, superseding the
former process of relying entirely on different independent external assessors for each application. These changes
may well have significant effects at the level of individuals
and groups applying for grants, but at a more general level
they can be seen to be a minor modification within the
peer review method of allocation.
Performance-based funding is used in Australia for
determining the ‘institutional grants’, a component of
research funding for universities that is allocated on a
competitive basis. (This role for performance-based funding is unusual in an international context.) The white
paper reports a change in the method of calculating this
funding: it is now to be 60% based on success in obtaining
research income, 30% on research student numbers and
10% on research output measured through publications.
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This is a change in percentages from previously, especially in putting more emphasis on research student
numbers. However, performance-based funding is not
used at the level of grant applications, so the effect of
the policy changes on individual researchers, which
will be mediated through administrative decision-making systems within universities, probably will be limited.
Thus, the government’s initiatives on research funding, while significant in relation to previous patterns,
are relatively minor within the wider context of possible
methods of allocating funds. Administrative decision
remains a dominant force, augmented by peer review
and institution-level performance-based allocation.
Equality as a method of allocation appears to have a
gradually declining role, while community-based allocation remains totally marginal.
As for the problems associated with grant schemes,
little is likely to change. Problems of bias, waste and
discouragement will remain. More significantly, pressures to orient research to dominant interests, especially
corporations and government, are increasing. Grant
schemes requiring alliances between university researchers and ‘outside partners’—typically corporations or governments—have been increasingly important in recent years. This increases the role of administrative decision, exercised by the outside partner, and
puts pressure on academics to link their research to
groups that have money and resources. Outside groups
without money are left out of the picture.
What does this picture imply in terms of recommendations for change? The answer depends crucially on
one’s goals. If the goal is to serve the interests of large
corporations and governments—which are commonly
legitimated by equating them with the ‘national interest’—then further expansion of grants requiring alliances with ‘industry’ would be called for. If the goal is to
promote innovation (both technological and social)
then, arguably, tied money and peer review serve as
deterrents and a much better strategy is to provide
ample guaranteed funding for a substantial period
(Horrobin 1996), along the lines of the equality model.
If the goal is to help solve problems raised by those
without money and power—such as poor people,
communities under environmental assault and people
with disabilities—then a move toward communitybased allocation is the way to go.
How to move in any given direction is a big topic,
beyond the scope of this paper. The key point here is
that the design of grant systems involves a set of social
choices that have wide-reaching effects, yet most discussion about grants takes place within a narrow set of
assumptions, without mention of dramatically different
allocation principles and associated consequences.
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